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CASE COMMENT

ELDRED V. RENO: AN EXAMPLE OF THE LAW
OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
L. Ray Patterson*
In Eldred v. Reno the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held
that the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), which extends the
copyright term for present and future works for twenty years, was a
constitutional exercise of Congress's copyright power.' The CTEA2 thus
puts an end (at least for two decades) to a policy in effect for more than two
centuries, since the Copyright Act of 1790, that the copyright of a work
expires at the end of a stated term defined at the time the copyright was
granted.3 Since works were copyrighted annually, the policy meant that each
year a certain number of copyrighted works entered the public domain, as
the copyright terms ended seriatim. The mandate of the CTEA is that no
copyrighted work in the United States will go into the public domain before
year 2018.' The Eldred case thus constitutes judicial approval of the
legislative moratorium of the constitutional mandate that copyright protect
the public domain, a policy in partial fulfillment of the fact that copyright,
as the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, is primarily to benefit the
public, only secondarily to benefit the author (as copyright holder).'

* S.J.D. Harvard 1966, LL.B. Mercer University 1956, M.A. Northwestern 1950, A.B. Mercer
University 1949. Mr. Patterson is the Pope Brock Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School
of Law where he teaches Copyright Law, Legal Profession, and Legal Malpractice.
' Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842 D.C. Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court
of the United States has granted certiorari to hear this case. On appeal to the Court, the case is now styled

Eldred v. Aslhcroft.
' Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
3 17 U.S.C. S 101 (1994).
' Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
s Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,432,220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665,
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Arguably, the CTEA serves the interest of no one except that of publishers
(and other copyright holders) and their heirs.
Eldred is thus contrary to the Supreme Court's long tradition of rendering
copyright decisions that serve the public interest in preference to the
publishers' interests. In Wheaton v. Peters,decided in 1834, the Court ruled
that copyright is a limited statutory monopoly, not the perpetual common
law monopoly that the publishers sought; 6 in Baker v. Selden, decided in
1879, the Court ruled that copyright does not protect ideas, as the plaintiff
claimed in seeking to protect his method of bookkeeping; 7 in Bobbs-Merrill
v. Straus, decided in 1908, publishers sought a ruling to give them the right
to control the secondary market for works they published, but the Court
ruled that the publisher's sale of a copy of a work exhausts the right to
control the future sale of that copy;' in Sony Corp. ofAmerican v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., decided in 1984, publishers desired to establish precedent
for a compulsory licensing scheme for personal copying, but the Court held
that an individual can copy a copyrighted motion picture off-the-air for
personal use without infringing the copyright;9 and in FeistPublications,Inc.
v. Rural Telephone Service Co., decided in 1991, the Court held that the white
pages of telephone directories are not copyrightable because they are not
original and originality is a constitutional condition for copyright. 0 The
Court also ruled that there is a constitutional right to use uncopyrightable
material in a copyrighted work.11
Unfortunately, lower federal courts have not always followed the lead of
the High Court in copyright cases and have created their own tradition by
rendering copyright decisions that serve the publishers' interest in preference
to the public interest. The most enigmatic example, perhaps, is the decision
in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, in which the lower courts
acquiesced to West's claim that the copyright monopoly protects its
publication of the opinions of both state and federal courts.12 The general

674 (1984).

6 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).

Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
'Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (1984).
to Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991).
" Id at 341.
12 West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226-27, 230 U.S.PQ. (BNA) 805 (8th Cir.

1986).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol8/iss2/3

2

Patterson: Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law of Unintended Consequences

20011

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

rule is that law is not copyrightable and the copyright statute specifically
denies copyright protection for works of the U.S. Government13 (of which
judicial decisions are a prime example), which would seem to have presented
insuperable obstacles to West's claim. The lower courts, however, were up
to the task. They granted protection to the page numbers of the reports,"'
but they did not explain how copyright for the pages of the reports does not
provide copyright protection for cases in the reports, however limited. 5
Perhaps the most brazen example of the lower courts' too often
Pavlovian response to the petition of publishers for relief to which they are
not entitled, in order to obtain a precedent that the copyright statute does
not justify, is the crippling of the fair use doctrine, a judicial creation of the
19th century that Congress codified in the 1976 Act." Thus, despite the
language of section 107 of that statute that the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including use by copying for purposes such as news reporting,
comment, criticism, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, and research is not an infringement of copyright, 17 publishers
have persuaded lower courts that the language does not mean what it says.
The argument was that the first paragraph, which contains the operative
language, is subordinate to the second, which lists the four factors for courts
to consider in determining if a use is fair."
As a rule, of course, the particular provisions of a statute should prevail
over the general, except when they defeat the purpose of the statute as
defined by the general provisions. Despite the fact that fair use is an
equitable doctrine, which logically brings the exception into play, publishers
have been very skillful in persuading courts that the exception does not
apply to fair use, even though not applying it is a rejection of the basic rule
of statutory construction that no provision of a statute should be disregarded. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that a copyshop, although acting

13

17 U.S.C. S 105.

1 See Mead DataCentral,799 F.2d at 1227.
I dIi

17 U.S.C. S 107 (1976).
17

Id

Is Id See Patterson, Folsom v. March and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431 (1998). The four

factors: 1) purpose and character of the use, 2) nature of the copyrighted work, 3) amount used, 4) effect
of use on the potential market. Logically, the first paragraph cannot subordinate because of the language

that any determination of fair use 'shall indude" the four factor application.
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for and at the request of professors to make copies for classroom use, was
guilty of copyright infringement. 9 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit ruled the same way in Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document
Servs., Inc.,2 thus perpetuating the odd rule that the legal duty of the agent
to a third party (not to copy copyrighted works without permission)
overrides the statutory right of the principal (to copy as a matter of fair use
for teaching purposes).
The publishers, however, may have achieved their most notable success
in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. In that case, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Texaco was liable for copyright
infringement because research scientists in Texaco's laboratory copied
articles for their files to use for their research, even though Texaco paid for
three subscriptions to the periodical (a scholarly journal) from which the
articles were copied." The court justified its conclusion by characterizing
the copying (by individual scientists for their individual files) as archival
copying. Since the implication is that the copies are made for posterity
rather than personal use in scholarly research, the archival characterization
is of dubious propriety.
Eldred v. Reno, which held that the Copyright Clause empowers
Congress to extend the copyright monopoly by adding a twenty-year term
to existing copyrights," isfirmly in the tradition of inferior courts producing
inferior copyright decisions. The grant of subsequent copyright protection
is clearly beyond both the wording and the spirit of the Copyright Clause.24
The court thus could have reached its result only by ignoring the fact that
the Copyright Clause is a limitation on as well as a grant of Congress's
copyright power. Further, because the court apparently was not aware that
the limitations define the policies of the Copyright Clause, it treated the
clause as a grant of plenary power that enables Congress to extend extant
copyright monopolies at will.
Two reasonable questions follow from the court's decision in Eldred:
Why the judicial tradition of granting the petitions of publishers in knee-jerk
fashion in the first place, and why the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
758 F. Supp. 1522, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
'o99 F.3d 1381, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (6th Cir. 1996).
21 60 F.3d 913, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (2d Cir. 1994).
1 Id[at 919.
19

239 F.3d 372, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

24 See Patterson, Understandingthe Copyright Clause,47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 365 (2000).
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Circuit followed it in the second? Neither question has a definitive answer,
but there are some ideas that may be relevant. As to the first question, a
helpful idea is the role of culture in governing our reasoning process, an
axiomatic proposition that needs no further discussion. Suffice it to say that
the publishers have used the proprietary culture that dominates the legal
system to persuade courts that copyright is merely an example of gardenvariety private property, which it clearly is not. Garden-variety property is
25
not created and defined by a statute that also limits the term of its existence,
and distinguishes between a physical object and the right to which that
object is subject.2 6 But the property fiction served-and continues to
serve-the cause of the publishers. Since property is by definition monopolistic, if copyright is merely an example of private property, any argument
that it is monopolistic descends to the realm of irrelevance. Moreover,
copyright is treated as being at the top of the hierarchy of private property
because it has the cachet of being the product of intellectual creativity.
However, one need only consider copyright for "statuettes, book ends,
clocks, lamps, door knockers, candlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy
banks, sundials, salt and pepper shakers, fish bowls, casseroles, and ash
trays," 27 to see how infirm the claim of intellectual creativity is as a
justification for the copyright monopoly. But, of course, one of the
characteristics of culture is that it is immune to logic, and given the
proprietary culture of the common law system, the rationalization of
rewarding intellectual activity has served the purpose of the publishers-a
bloated copyright monopoly-without examination.
As to the second question, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
was merely following a tradition of the common law system, that is,
piecemeal jurisprudence. Each case is to be decided on its own merits in
relation to the rights of the parties, not the public interest. And, of course,
each case can serve as precedent for future cases, which explains the
astounding comment of the court in regard to copyright and First Amendment rights. "[W]e held in United Video that copyrights are categorically

25

Sections 107-20 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. S 101 etseq. (1994) are limitations on the

rights granted to a copyright holder in 17 U.S.C. S 106.
26 17 U.S.C. S 106. The exclusive rights in this section, subject to limitations, are: 1) right to
reproduce, 2) right to prepare derivative works, 3) right to distribute copies, 4) right to perform, and 5)
right to display. They show the limited rights to which a copyright holder is entitled.

v Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 220, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325, 334 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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immune from challenges under the First Amendment."28 This is piecemeal
jurisprudence with a vengeance, a rule that can only have been spawned in
disregard of the fact that the subject of both the Copyright Clause and the
First Amendment copyright is the communication of ideas.
The overlap of free speech rights and copyright presents abundant
opportunities for conflict because of the different approaches to the subject,
negative in the First Amendment ("Congress shall make no law . . ."2%
affirmative in the Copyright Clause ("The Congress shall have Power... To
promote the Progress of Science . . .'0). Such a conflict can, of course, be
avoided by judicial fiat. Unfortunately, such a fiat could be issued only in
ignorance of-or contempt for-the policies of the Copyright Clause.
Arguably, the United Video statement is evidence of the court's contempt for
those policies, as discussed below.
Only policy can explain the grant and denial of a congressional power as
to the same subject matter in two separate constitutional provisions, one of
which is an amendment. The negative approach in one instance and the
affirmative approach in the other suggests that indeed there is a policy that
reconciles the two ostensibly conflicting provisions. Given that the subject
matter of both provisions is information in the form of facts-the building
blocks of knowledge-logically that policy can be only the right of public
access. In short, the governing principle of both the First Amendment and
the Copyright Clause is the right of public access to materials that enable the
people to learn, for political purposes in some instances, and for personal
education in others. Unfortunately, the principle of access has been
obscured by the emphasis on the right to print and speak under the First
Amendment and on copyright as private property under the Copyright
Clause. But why would the Framers forbid Congress to regulate the right
to print and speak and give Congress the power to create a property right in
writings unless, in both instances, the goal is to enable the people to read and
hear? The important point is that under the First Amendment, Congress
cannot constitutionally deny public access to either the spoken or printed
word, and under the Copyright Clause, Congress can constitutionally enact

" See E/dred,239 F.3d at 375 (explaining the application of Harper &Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) in that, "there is no First Amendment Right to make commercial use of the

copyrighted works of others").
" US. CONST. amend. I.
3 U.S.CONST. art. I, S 8, d. 8.
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only a copyright statute that protects the right of public access to the printed
word, which is why the Framers empowered Congress to grant copyright
only for published books."1
The court provides further evidence of its disdain for policy in its
statement that, "The CTEA is but the latest in a series of congressional
extensions of the copyright term, each of which has been made applicable
both prospectively and retrospectively."32 What the court did not say (and
what it may not have known) was that every extension it cited was enacted
in conjunction with the enactment of a copyright statute (in 1790) or a major
revision of the statute (in 1830, 1870, 1909 and 1976). The cited statutes thus
involved policy considerations different from those presented by a standalone statute that extends the copyright term of extant works with no
discernible benefit to the public interest, as does the CTEA.3
Moreover, the logic of the argument that the scope of Congress's
constitutional copyright power can be measured by the statutes that
Congress enacts in exercising that power is difficult to find. It may just be
possible that Congress on occasion exceeds its power, and courts should
decide whether it has done so in enacting a particular statute independently
of congressional action. To put the point bluntly, courts should not rely on
the action of Congress in enacting a statute as proof of its constitutional right
to do so. Moreover, if the U.S. Supreme Court is correct in continually
reiterating that copyright is primarily to benefit the public interest and only
secondarily to benefit the author, it seems only fair that the Eldred court
should have explained how a statute that contravenes a basic policy of the
Copyright Clause-protection of the public domain-benefits the public in
preference to publishers and their heirs, born and to be born.
The Eldred court's apparent premise-the scope of Congress's constitutional power is measured not by the Constitution but by what Congress
does-enables the court to use congressional action in support of its position.

s The "exclusive right* that Congress can grant to authors is only the exclusive right to publish their
writings. Note, for example, that the Copyright Act of 1790 was available only for printed books, a
condition that continued in every copyright statute Congress enacted until the 1976 Copyright Act under
the influence of the Berne Convention. See Patterson, Copyrigbtand "theexclusive Right"ofA uthor, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1993).
32 Eldred, 239 F.3d at 374.
" See Paul J.Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual
PropertyClauseas an Absolute Constrainton Congress, 4 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119,1174-76 (2000) (stating that
the CTEA grants a twenty year income stream to favored industries).
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Thus, the court noted that in 1976 Congress altered "the way the term of a
copyright is computed so as to conform with the Berne Convention and
with international practice."34 The way Congress chose to compute the
copyright, of course, was from the moment of fixation,"5 a constitutionally
questionable change in view of the limitation of copyright to published
books in 1787. Constitutional issues aside, however, one can be almost
certain that the purpose of the change in the method of computation was
simply to enlarge the term of copyright monopoly, for which the Berne
Convention provided political cover. Thus, there is reason to be concerned
about the impact of the Berne Convention on American copyright law. The
concern is that the court gave its imprimatur to the apparent decision of
Congress to use the Berne Convention, not the Copyright Clause, as the
measure of its copyright power.
We see here evidence of the publishers' greatest success in their efforts to
shape the copyright culture. Somehow, they have managed to persuade
lower courts that the Copyright Clause is irrelevant to both Congress's
power to enact copyright statutes, and the courts' duty to interpret those
statutes, despite the fact that logically courts should be bound by the
Copyright Clause in interpreting copyright statutes just as Congress should
be bound by it in enacting them. The success of the publishers is surely
explained in part by the courts' reluctance to accept the relevance of this
truism to their decision process,36 but it may also be explained in part by
both the proprietary culture and the piecemeal jurisprudence of the common
law system. But in view of the deference that courts normally give to
statutes that Congress has enacted, a major reason probably is the lobbyists
of the copyright industry who line the halls of Congress eager to replenish
the reelection coffers of members of the right committees. (The custom of
allowing the copyright industry to write copyright legislation apparently
dates back to 1905 when Thorvald Solberg, the Register of Copyright,
wanted a new copyright statute and realized that he would have to have the
cooperation of the industry to get it.')

35See 17 U.S.C.

S 102(a) (2001)

("Copyright protection subsists .... in original works of authorship

fixed in any tangible medium of expression.. .).
" See, eg., Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(rejecting the notion "that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on
congressional power.").
" See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 2 (1909) (statement of Thorvald Soldberg) (emphasizing the need
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Contributing to the relegation of the Copyright Clause to irrelevance and
to the industry's success in shaping copyright law is judicial ignorance of the
policies in the Copyright Clause. 8 This is not a criticism, but a situation
reflecting the fact that in the law school curriculum, copyright has emerged
from the backwater category only in recent years, and even today, few
copyright casebooks deal with the constitutional dimensions of copyright.
Thus, most courts must use on-the-job training in copyright cases and
necessarily rely on the citations and arguments presented by copyright
counsel whose bias naturally represents their clients, copyright holders. And
we can say with confidence that the interest of those clients is not congruent
with the policies. Those policies are three: 1)the promotion of learning; 2)
the protection of the public domain; and 3) public access to copyrighted
material. Thus, the Constitution requires that the copyright statute
Congress enacts shall be designed to do three things: to promote learning,
because the clause so states; to protect the public domain, because copyright
is available only to authors only for their original writings only for a limited
time; and public access, because the "exclusive Right" that the Framers in
1787 gave Congress the power to grant was the exclusive right to publish a
work. 3
Presumably the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Eldred was
engaged in on-the-job training; otherwise, it surely would have recognized
that these three constitutional policies promote "Science,"' that is,
knowledge. And the court might even have agreed with President George
Washington about the importance of knowledge as he stated in his address
to Congress on January 8, 1790, encouraging the enactment of a copyright
statute. "Knowledge is, in every country," he said, "the surest basis of public
happiness."41 And he went on to note that in a country "in which the
measures of government receive their impression so immediately from the

to update copyright laws in the light of insufficiencies in existing laws).
' Even Judge Learned Hand, recognized as a, if not the, leading jurist in copyright, in the early

twentieth century made a notable faux pas in ignorance of the copyright policies in the Copyright Clause.
He fathered the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine that the U.S. Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in
FeistPublications,Inc. v. Rural TeleboneSemve Co., 499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991). See
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,54,28 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 330 (2d. Cir. 1936).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8.
"U.S. CONST. art. 1, S 8, cl. 8.
" President George Washington, Address to Congress Can. 8, 1790) (microform available in the

University of Georgia Library).
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sense of the community as in ours, it is proportionably essential."42
President Washington's comments suggest that he considered knowledge as
important to a free society as private property and, perhaps, even more so.
Washington's position, of course, is confirmed by the three constitutional
copyright policies. And since he was one of the Framers of the Constitution,
it is not unreasonable to think that the Copyright Clause was the source of
his sentiments, especially since those sentiments were expressed to encourage
the enactment of a copyright statute.
The copyright policies, however, are not a part of the current copyright
culture. We can assume that one reason is that the policies are contrary to
the interest of publishers, who have had the largest role in shaping attitudes
toward copyright. Publishers, for example, would probably find the idea of
a copyright policy to protect the public domain laughable, a conclusion
supported by the preeminent copyright lobbyist Jack Valenti, who is
supposed to have said the limited time provision of the Copyright Clause
means that Congress can provide for a copyright term one day short of
eternity. Allied with the publishers, of course, are their lawyers who, in
copyright litigation, lack any interest in providing the court with any
information that gives support to the U.S. Supreme Court's position that
copyright is primarily to benefit the public interest, as the policies clearly do.
That, of course, is the cynical view. A less cynical view is that copyright
lawyers are ignorant of the policies, which can be traced to the first English
copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 1710, which is the source of the
language in the Copyright Clause.43 The courts, however, bear some
responsibility for ignoring the copyright policies because an analysis of the
Copyright Clause, found in the Intellectual Property Clause (IP Clause),
makes the policies clear. The IP Clause reads: "Congress shall have
power... to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries .... ""
One value of analyzing the IPClause is that it makes clear that the clause
is to be read distributively; copyright is not, as is often said, to promote both
42 Jd
43 The title of the Statute of Anne read: "An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the
copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned."
8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.). The core ideas, the promotion of learning, authors, and limited times are
the same as in the Copyright Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I S 8, cl. 8.
" U.S. CONST. art. I,
S 8, d.8.
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"the Progress of Science and useful Arts." The latter goal is the purpose of
patents," and the goal of copyright is to promote Science, that is learning.'
This is apparent from the fact that the Intellectual Property Clause contains
the Copyright Clause and the Patent Clause, and thus grants to Congress
two powers, the copyright power and the patent power. Congress has
exercised each of the powers independently of each other since April, 1790, 47
when it enacted the first patent statute, and May, 1790,4' when it enacted the
first U.S. copyright statute.
The unique characteristic of the IP Clause is that it states not only the
goal for which the power is granted to Congress, but also the procedure by
which the goal is to be achieved. In the case of copyright, this procedure is
to grant to authors for a limited time the exclusive right to their writings.
A stated goal, of course, limits the power to achieve that goal. Thus, for a
court to say, as did the Eldred court, that the goal of the promotion of
learning is irrelevant to the power of Congress to enact copyright
legislation 49 is to say that the power the Framers designed to be limited
becomes unlimited. And for a court to rule that the copyright power is
unlimited is to amend the Copyright Clause by judicial fiat by reason of the
rule of stare decisis, which gives the ruling continuing efficacy within the
court's jurisdiction. The court makes the point by relying on its rule in
Schnapper v. Foley, 0 "in which we rejected the argument 'that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional
power.' "" The court in Eldred thus ignored the fact that in Schnapper it
rewrote the Copyright Clause to read: "Congress shall have Power to secure
for limited Times to Authors the exclusive Right to their Writings."52
Presumably the court's judicial revision of the Copyright Clause was
unwitting, but to avoid perpetrating the error, the court should recognize
that it takes only one further unwitting step in the reasoning process to
ensure that the copyright power of Congress shall be absolute. That step is

"See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 462
(1966) (noting that "federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes
the Congress 'To promote the Progress of... useful Arts.' ).
J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316, 320 (C.A. 7. 1897).
" Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
4' Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 377-78.
667 F.2d 102, 112,212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
'1 Eldred, 239 F.3d at 378.
52ld
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to define limited times as one day short of eternity, and we can be sure that
the step is one that the publishers are willing to assist the courts in taking.
The dissent in Eldred rejected Schnapper, which apparently caused the
majority some discomfort, because it supported its position with alternative
reasoning, that it need only decide that the CTEA is a " 'necessary and
proper' exercise of the power conferred upon the Congress by the Copyright
Clause." 3
Said the majority:
The Congress found that extending the duration of copyrights on existing works would, among other things, give
copyright holders an incentive to preserve older works,
particularly motion pictures in need of restoration.' If
called upon to do so, therefore, we might well hold that the
application of the CTEA to subsisting copyrights is "plainly
adapted" and "appropriate" to "promot[ing] progress.""
There is, insofar as I can determine, no language in the Copyright Clause
that empowers Congress to grant a copyright for the preservation of works.
Indeed, it has been understood from the beginning of statutory copyright
that the creation of a new work is the unalterable condition for copyright,
a condition that the Framers, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized,
made a-part of the Copyright Clause, and that Congress retained in the 1976
Copyright Act. 6 The last point is significant because Congress in the 1976
Act revolutionized copyright law by, among other changes, eliminating
publication as a condition for copyright.' Moreover, as I read the Copyright
Clause, it does not, despite what the court said, provide for "promot[ing]
progress."" Rather, it provides for "promot[ing] the Progressof Science," 9
that is learning.

53 Id

s4Id at 379 (citing S. REP. No. 104-315, at 12 (1996)).
" Id (citing Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 774, 777 (9th Cir.

1985)).
17 U.S.C. S 102 (2001) (requiring originality for a work to be copryrightable).
See H.R. REP. No.94-1476, at 129 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-553, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat.) 5659,
5745 (stating that "the concept of publication would lose its all-embracing importance.. .).
'6 See
'7

5

I.
U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cd. 8 (emphasis added).
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An additional copyright term for a restored work, of course, may
encourage the preservation of knowledge, but it does not "promote
progress," and its cost is prohibitive; the price is the forfeiture of the
constitutional policy that copyright protect the public domain. The
protection of the public domain, of course, is why the condition for the
copyright monopoly is somewhat more stringent than the condition for the
restoration of a work. The condition for copyright is the creation of a new
work, not the recycling of old works.
Assuming that the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit respects rulings
of the U.S. Supreme Court, we have here an example of unintended
consequences, for the court's reasoning will lead to the revival of the sweatof-the-brow doctrine that the U.S. Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in Feist.' Arguably, no matter how skilled the restorer, the restoration will lack that element of creativity that Feist held to be a part of the
originality required for copyright. 6' Moreover, presumably the court meant
that the restoration copyright is available to all copyright holders, even those
who are assignees of the author. Thus, the court creates by implication a
judicial fiction that a restorer is an author, a counterpart to the statutory
fiction that the employer of an author is the author. While courts may be
willing to sustain a fiction to create authors employed by Congress, this does
not mean that they themselves should engage in the process of creating
authors by fiction. This would entitle non-authors to copyright protection
contrary to the express language of the Copyright Clause.62 One of the
purposes of limiting copyright to authors was to keep the monopoly of
copyright within reasonable bounds; thus, to leave the author out of the
copyright equation is to extend those bounds (and encroach onto the public
domain).
Moreover, it is difficult to understand how the application of the CTEA
is " 'plainly adapted' and 'appropriate' to 'promot[ing] progress.' "63 The
court apparently overlooked the fact that the extension of copyright to older
works in need of restoration is just as likely to inhibit, as to promote,
"progress," whatever that means. The copyright of the restored work

'oFeist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating "primary objective of
the copyright is not to reward the labor of authors but to 'promote progress of science and useful arts.' ").
Id at 358 (stating "originality requires ...that it [the work] display minimal level of creativity.").

See U.S. CONST., art. I, S 8 (granting Congress the power to secure for limited times "to
Authors ... the exclusive Right to their... Writings").
" Eldred,239 F.3d at 379.
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becomes the property of the restorer, and if the first copyright has expired,
restoration recalls the work from the public domain, which restores the
power to control access to the work. But the reason for the limited
copyright term in the first place is to protect and enrich the public domain
by terminating that power.
Given the fact that the court wrote the introductory language out of the
Copyright Clause, one is justified in suspecting that the court's motive here
is to provide another way to rewrite the Copyright Clause, "the necessary
and proper" exercise of the copyright power. Perhaps this is why the court
supported its position by employing Congress's statement that preserving
older works justifies an extension of the copyright monopoly, which
somehow, seems to be reminiscent of bootstrap reasoning. Apparently, the
court did not recognize that the effect of this exercise of the "necessary and
proper" exercise of the copyright power gives Congress the power to destroy
the public domain.
To escape the Alice-in-Wonderland logic of Eldred,we need to return to
the language of the Intellectual Property Clause, and read it as it was written,
that is distributively. The Copyright Clause reads: "Congress shall have
Power to promote the Progress of Science by securing for [a] limited
Time[ ]. ..to Authors the exclusive Right to their Writings.""
The Patent Clause reads: The "Congress shall have Power ...[t]o
promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for [a] limited Time[]
to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries.""5
Thus, Congress can promote the progress of knowledge by securing for
a limited time to authors the exclusive right to their writings, and promote
the useful arts by securing for a limited time to inventors the exclusive right
to their discoveries. Contrary to the court's cavalier treatment of the limited
time provision, there is a good argument that it is the most important
limitation on Congress's copyright power. If the copyright is not limited,
it is perpetual; and a perpetual copyright inhibits the progress of learning,
destroys the public domain, and does not provide for public access. Anyone
who views these conclusions as fanciful will be surprised to learn that this
was precisely the situation in England with the perpetual publishers'
copyright that was the predecessor to the limited term statutory author's

U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, d. 8.
6s Id
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copyright of the Statute of Anne, the direct source of the policies contained
in the Copyright Clause, which merits further discussion.
Of the three policies, the protection of the public domain and public
access are most easily established. The requirement of originality and the
limited term mean that copyright cannot be used to capture works in the
public domain and that all copyrighted works go into the public domain
after a "limited Time."6 The public access policy is made clear by the
meaning of the "exclusive Right" as the right to publish writings, which
ensured public access.67 This, of course, is why copyright was limited to
printed books in the Copyright Act of 1790, and to assume that the
"exclusive Right" meant more is to attribute to the Framers a prescience to
which even they are not entitled.6'
The problematic policy is the promotion of learning, as indicated by the
court's position that the provision is not a limitation of Congress's power.
Presumably the reason for this position, although not stated, is that if taken
in its normal meaning, the phrase would require a content-based copyright,
which would surely violate the free press clause of the First Amendment.
Yet, it is difficult to believe that the Framers would include in the Constitution language that has no meaning; moreover, history tells us why they did
include it. In this instance, history speaks with a particularly clear voice
because we can identify the direct source of the language in the Copyright
Clause. In 1710, copyright was only fifteen or so years removed from its use
as a device of censorship and continued to be used to monopolize the book
trade. The contemporary concerns for this use of the "property in books"
shaped the Statute of Anne' and ultimately the Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.'
Recall that copyright is a monopoly and that one of the features of a
monopoly is the right of the monopolist to control access. The societal
context that led to the enactment of the Statute of Anne-the monetary and

66 I

See also Patterson, supra note 31 (defining and exploring the meaning of 'exclusive right").
See id4at 14 (discussing the American understanding of copyright).
Statutes at Large, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19, p. 82.
'0 I believe I am correct to assert that the Copyright Clause isthe only provision of the Constitution
for which we can identify its precise source. The closest example is the First Amendment, for which the
source was almost certainly the Licensing Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, in England. But the
influence of the Licensing Act was negative-it told the Framers what to provide to avoid the evils of that
Act.
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political monopolies of the booktrade-demonstrate the two reasons for
controlling access to copyrighted works. One is to protect the monopoly for
marketing the work; the other is to protect the content of the work against
access for political reasons, that is, censorship. This, indeed, was the dual
purpose of the publishers' copyright in England that was the predecessor of
the statutory copyright. The Licensing Act of 1662, which forbade the
publication of schismatical, blasphemous, seditious and heretical material,
protected the publishers' copyright in return for the publishers' aid to the
official licensors. The copyright that preceded the statutory copyright was
thus both a device of monopoly and an instrument of censorship, and the
Statute of Anne was carefully crafted to prevent the continued use of
copyright for these purposes. Thus, the English act contained a provision
for controlling the prices of books, an anti-monopoly provision; and made
the goal of copyright the encouragement of learning, an anti-censorship
provision.
The phrase-to promote the Progress of Science-captures in a few words
both the anti-monopoly and the anti-censorship goals. Monopoly prices
inhibit learning for monetary reasons (the reason for the price control
provisions of the Statute of Anne) and control of access in the form of
censorship inhibits learning for political reasons. This is why copyright was
made available only for printed books. Thus, contrary to the publishers'
copyright, which came into existence with the registration of the title of any
book, the statutory copyright did not come into existence until a newly
written book was published. The grant of copyright for an original work
that was published ensured that copyright would promote learning and not
be used as a device of official censorship. At the least, it would have made
the licensing scheme inefficient and a policy resented by the people, as was
censorship,' would need to be as efficient as possible. Moreover, the narrow
scope of copyright in 1787 prevented the use of copyright for the purpose of
private censorship. That scope was limited to the right to reproduce copies
of the copyrighted book for sale, but the right was limited to the book as it

n 13 & 14 Car. II, c.33.
This author's justification for this is that the Licensing Act of 1662 always contained sunset
provisions, and as soon as the question of the religion of the monarch-a major reason for press
control-was settled by the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Act was allowed to expire for all time six
years later, in 1694.
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was published. Thus, it was not an infringement of copyright to abridge,
translate or otherwise adapt the book and publish it.
A vestige of this doctrine survives in the form of the "idea/expression
dichotomy," which is said to prevent copyright from violating the First
Amendment."3 This protection for First Amendment rights, however, is
more appropriate for political than for artistic expression, whether in visual
or written form. The point is that the copyright monopoly has been so
enlarged that the distinction has become irrelevant in regard to creative
works. The right to prepare derivative works, for example, provides
protection for ideas. The ideas in the novel are protected when the novel is
made into a screenplay for a motion picture, even though the expression is
entirely different. It is this change, together with new communication
technology, that has brought the problem of private censorship to the
forefront. Thus, the enlargement of the proprietary base of copyright
provided the publishers with a platform to persuade Congress and the courts
that new technology entitles them to control access to copyrighted material
after that material has entered the stream of commerce. The silent premise,
of course, is that greater control of access means greater profit. In terms of
scope, copyright can be viewed as a horizontal monopoly; in terms of time,
copyright can be viewed as a vertical monopoly. In combination, the result
is to enhance the copyright monopoly in geometric, not arithmetic, terms.
This is why the CTEA is so harmful to the public welfare.
The mechanics of copyright today are essentially the same as when
copyright was used as a device of public censorship. And it seems likely that
the draftsman of the Statute of Anne, reputed to have been Jonathan Swift,
recognized that private censorship could be as inimical to the public welfare
as official censorship. Thus, the pattern of the Statute of Anne-original
writings, publication, and price control-was designed to preclude copyright
for this purpose. Except for price control-not an appropriate provision for
a constitution-the design was adopted by the Framers for the Copyright
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
That a highly respected federal court could be so wrong on so important
an issue as the power of Congress to extend a private monopoly over
information in a free society to the benefit of the few and the detriment of
the many is an enigma. Perhaps the best explanation is that the court was

" Harper & Row Publ'g, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
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the victim of the law of unintended consequences. The consequence in this
case is that publishers can use their private property for profit by using a
system of private licenses to control the public's political right to know,
which surely was unintended. I say this because unintended consequences
almost invariably result from ignorance. The relevant ignorance here-which
is not limited to the D.C. Circuit-is that copyright represents a conflict
between two fundamental policies of American law: property rights and
political rights.
Both rights are fundamental to a free society. Without private property,
the citizen has no power to act against tyranny, and without knowledge, he
or she has no reason to act. Thus, the conflict is in the fact that the subject
of the property of copyright is information, which calls for a modification
of property principles, as, indeed, the phrase "intellectual property" suggests.
The modification of property principles, of course, calls for compromise.
The value of copyright history is that it enables us to see the struggle to
achieve compromise and the terms of the compromise that resulted, which
are seen in the Copyright Clause: The grant of an exclusive right for a
limited time to authors of original works. History also shows the extent to
which the compromise is at risk because property is a more tangible benefit
than knowledge, and property owners continually seek to enlarge their
property rights. The classic effort in this regard was the effort of publishers
in England to replace the limited statutory copyright with a perpetual
common law copyright, which was finally defeated by the House of Lords
in Donaldsonv. Beckett in 1774.7' The Supreme Court cases discussed at the
beginning of this essay, however, provide sufficient proof of the point.
The CTEA, of course, is in the tradition of publishers seeking to enhance
their monopoly, and it should be noted that publishers use both the
legislative and the judicial forums to achieve their goal. They used the
legislature to obtain an extension of the copyright term,"5 but they used
courts to destroy the fair use doctrine, at least for teaching 6 and research."

'
1 Eng. Rep. 837, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774) (holding that common law copyright disappeared
upon publication).
' Act of Feb. 3, 183 1, SS 1-2, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 5 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076

(repealed 1976); 17 U.S.C. S 101 et seq.
' Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (6th
Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437

(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
" American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (2d Cir.
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Rarely, however, have the publishers had such a victory as lawyers for the
U.S. Government and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit gave
them in the Eldred case. Not only do they get a twenty-year extension for
their monopolies, they also have a precedent that will empower Congress to
grant them another twenty-year extension at the end of the current
extension. Surely the Eldred court did not realize that because of the CTEA,
no copyrighted work in the U.S. will go into the public domain until 2018,
a moratorium that is contrary to the policy that copyright shall enrich the
public domain. Indeed, the court manifests a lack of awareness of the point
in its conclusion, which deserves a few comments.
First, the court said, "The plaintiffs' first amendment objection fails
because they have no cognizable first amendment interest in the copyrighted
work of others.""8 This statement reflects the parochial view that the First
Amendment is only to protect the rights of the speaker and printer, not the
people. This is analogous to the trickle-down theory of economics. If the
printer and speaker are protected, the people will read and hear, so the
theory goes. But the theory falters if the printer and speaker can determine
if-and on what terms-the people can read and hear, which they can do if
their words are fixed and thus copyrighted. And under the 1976 Copyright
Act, if the words are original, that is not copied from another, copyright
cannot be avoided. The copyright monopoly is automatically granted for
original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
Second, the court said: "[Plaintiffs'] objection that extending the term of
subsisting copyright violates the requirement of originality misses the mark
because originality is by its nature a threshold inquiry relevant to
copyrightability, not a continuing concern relevant to the authority of the
Congress to extend the term of a copyright." 9 By this reasoning, Congress
is empowered to continue to renew extant copyrights almost to the end of
time, that is until one day short of eternity. Arguably, in view of the
limitations on Congress's copyright power, it would be more reasonable to
say that the grant of a copyright exhausts the condition of originality, which
cannot then be used to obtain another copyright term because it does not
further contribute to the promotion of the "Progress of Science."

1995).
n Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380.
7da
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Third, the court said: "Whatever wisdom or folly the plaintiffs may see
in the particular 'limited Times' for which Congress has set the duration of
copyrights, that decision is subject to judicial review only for rationality.""0
But is rationality to be measured in terms of the desires of publishers or the
words of the Copyright Clause? Given the constitutional policies of
copyright, the question is not did Congress act rationally, but why did it act
so irrationally.
One suspects that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit did not
act irrationally, that is in ignorance of what it was doing, at all. Given what
I suspect was its premise-it is vitally important to protect the economic
interests of American publishers in today's shrinking world-its result, albeit
achieved by reasoning of questionable soundness, was wholly rational. The
court's ruling thus reflects the truism that the property culture dominates
judicial decisions whenever the protection of property is at issue, as it always
is in copyright cases. But there are times when property rights must be
subordinated to higher values, for the failure to act to protect the higher
values inevitably proves to have been a costly mistake. The classic example
is the Dred Scott decision in which property in the form of people was
preferred over human freedom.
The analogy of Eldred can easily be criticized as being overwrought, but
ultimately the issue in both cases was freedom, from private slavery in one
instance, freedom from private censorship in the other. Is not ignorance a
form of slavery? We must not make the mistake of underestimating the
power of the profit motive and the willingness of publishers to become
profiteers of the press by controlling the people's right to know, just as slave
owners were profiteers in human misery.
To say that if the price of "globalization" and "harmonization" are
fundamental values protected by the Free Speech and Copyright Clauses of
the U.S. Constitution is a costly cynicism. Presumably, the thinking is that
the cost is necessary for the price of progress, and, after all, as the Eldred
court recognized, the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to "Promote
Progress." There is, however, much to be said in favor of the Copyright
Clause and the policies it mandates. And it may be that if we start with the

policies in seeking to resolve the new conflict between property rights and
political rights that new communications technology has thrust upon us, we
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may find a solution for the people as satisfactory for the computer as the
Framers found for the printing press. At the least, we should not foreclose
the effort by decisions such as Eldred v. Reno, which seek to provide the
answer without knowing the question. Such effort almost always produces
unintended consequences, most of them unpleasant.
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